000 01335cam a2200193 4500500
005 20250112034209.0
041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aAubert, Nicolas
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Grand, Bernard
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Lapied, André
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Rousseau, Patrick
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aIs Employee Ownership so Senseless
260 _c2009.
500 _a38
520 _aSince Enron and the ruin of thousands of its employees, employee ownership is harshly criticized. Investing savings in employer’s stock would be equivalent to bet on only one asset. Moreover, employee ownership’s debated efficiency would not justify employers to grant company stock to their employees. Still, employee ownership is put in place by thousands of companies and withhold by millions of employees throughout the world. This paper considers a moral hazard setting where a risk neutral entrepreneur grants company stock to its risk averse employee as an incentive. We show that there is an optimal transfer of employee ownership that satisfies employee’s risk preference and has an incentive effect. We thus bring about rational argument in favor of employee ownership.
786 0 _nFinance | 30 | 2 | 2009-12-01 | p. 5-29 | 0752-6180
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-finance-2009-2-page-5?lang=en
999 _c167093
_d167093