000			01183cam a2200193 4500500
005			20250112031739.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aRieu, Jérome _eauthor
245	0	0	_aNational Policies for Fighting Climate Change and Competition Regulation: The Case of Taxation
260			_c2002.
500			_a73
520			_aThe obligation to comply with the Kyoto protocol prompts many governments to tax greenhouse gas emissions. Basic efficiency is supposed to be obtained by imposing a single tax rate on the entire economy. This article shows that the need for global economic efficiency may make tax relief for certain sectors socially desirable within the framework of an imperfect multilateral agreement. This raises a fresh problem for the global and European competition authorities, for whom decentralised application of basic mechanisms normally leads to a global optimum.
690			_aclimate change
690			_aoptimum taxation
690			_acompetition rules
786	0		_nEconomie & prévision | o 155 | 4 | 2002-10-01 | p. 95-113 | 0249-4744
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-1-2002-4-page-95?lang=en
999			_c156767 _d156767