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This essay attempts to draw a parallel between the musician John Cage and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, the former a composer – if indeed this is the right term – of « sound games » inseparable from everyday settings in which supposedly impure and nonmusical « noises » abound, and the latter an inventor of « language games » similarly apprehended in the context of everyday life. A detailed comparison between Cage’s and Wittgenstein’s « pragmatic » rather than « empirical » approaches sheds light on what Cage himself termed his « philosophy », which he equates with a form of « music action » whereby he rebels against the tyranny of the « great form » and the traditional European understanding of musical syntax. This essay reflects on the similar ways in which Cage and Wittgenstein attempt to distance themselves from established notions of harmony, the former by reexamining the nature of musical significance, and the latter by calling into question the notion that words somehow « fit » the world. Cage’s questioning of intention and its role in musical composition is central to the argument.