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The former French president, François Mitterrand, is both criticized and lauded for his handling of the crisis that, in March 1983, marked the culmination of the “austerity turn” during his first term in office. He is criticized for indecisiveness because it took him more than a week to decide what action to take on two fronts: the French currency on the one hand, and his government on the other, after his party’s defeat in the municipal elections. But he is lauded for choosing a pro-European path by deciding to stay in the European Monetary System (EMS) and agreeing to devalue the franc for the third time in two years. Neither of these assessments of Mitterrand’s conduct during the crisis is, however, justified. The president did not opt to stay in the EMS because of his inclination to promote European integration. In fact, at first, he was set on exiting the EMS; he only reconsidered his decision due to certain frictions and facilitating elements at the individual, domestic, and international level. His fundamental uneasiness as regards economic issues, the profound splits in his administration on the best course of action, and the poor performance of the French economy vis-à-vis its main trading partners were three crucial contextual factors. These were accompanied by three major shifts: the prime minister’s refusal to implement Mitterrand’s initial decision on the EMS; a changing balance between the opposing groups in the administration; and German willingness to help France deal with the crisis. All the options remained on the table until the very end, and it was impossible for the president to take a decision before the last pieces of the puzzle fell into place on 21 March.