Employer-mandated complementary health insurance in France: The likely effects on social welfare
Type de matériel :
59
The ANI reform mandates all private sector employers to offer sponsored Complementary Health Insurance (CHI) to all of their employees beginning on January 1st, 2016. This research simulates the likely effects of this mandate on the welfare of the population considering the Expected utility theory framework. The results show that the ANI reform may induce an increase in social welfare only if wages and CHI’s premiums remain the same. Assuming that premiums of individual CHI contracts increase because of the new risks segmentation, the reform may hardly impact the social welfare. The gain in welfare that benefit private sector employees is therefore offset by the loss of welfare that suffer the individuals insured by an individual CHI contract or who chose to be uninsured before the reform. Considering in addition that employers will include their subsidy amount into wages, the reform may greatly reduce the social welfare.
Réseaux sociaux