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First, we return to the question of ‘revelation’ that has never been taken as an object of research. There has always been reluctance to take it seriously. However, Durkheim changed his thematic and theoretical perspectives from 1897, focusing on religious facts. Second, we explain how to treat revelation as a ‘thing’, as an object of research, insisting on the exegetical method by positioning ourselves prior to the emergence of ‘revelation’ (1895) to identify the paths that were decisive for Durkheim. All the articles in the special issue follow this approach. Third, we show how Durkheim went about ‘treating religious facts as things’, via the comparative method: by comparing the objectification of religion in other disciplines (history, law, psychology, philosophy), to arrive at a sociological synthesis; by comparing religious facts (and especially sacrifice) within different religions. The six articles in the special issue demonstrate the importance of the comparative method in social science. They ought to be compared with each other.