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In their controversial book on “economic negationism,” Cahuc and Zylberberg draw on three arguments: economics had become an experiment-based science, which would bring about an epistemological rupture, which in turn would bring theory and facts into close quarters. Even though the main observation is ill-founded (since the vast majority of modern economics does not use randomized trials, or field or laboratory experiments), the aim of this article is to examine the relevance of the latter two arguments. We show that experimental methods fit perfectly within mainstream epistemology. This would therefore mean evolution instead of revolution. Besides, experimental processes are theory-laden and are not devoid of theory or without technical flaws of their own. Data must always be compiled and interpreted; the so-called “experimentation method” does not change this. Finally, we reflect on the place of facts in modern economics. They inspire new theories by signaling empirical deviations that must be accounted for. This would hint at a limited renewal, as research programs tend to strengthen their “hard core” by making secondary theories compatible with empirical results. JEL classification codes: B41, C90.