Stratégies de coopération fiscale horizontale entre collectivités locales de même taille : une analyse fondée sur la théorie des jeux (notice n° 840434)
[ vue normale ]
| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 01724cam a2200265 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250123142053.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Morer, Myriam |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Stratégies de coopération fiscale horizontale entre collectivités locales de même taille : une analyse fondée sur la théorie des jeux |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2003.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 1 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Résumé L’objet de cet article est de montrer, en s’appuyant sur le cadre institutionnel français et grâce à la théorie des jeux, pourquoi la concurrence fiscale spontanée existe entre collectivités locales juxtaposées de même strate démographique et que l’intercommunalité, c’est-à-dire le regroupement de communes à l’initiative des pouvoirs publics, est alors la seule solution envisageable. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | Thanks to games theory and within the french institutional framework, the aim of this paper is first to explain why we observe a spontaneous tax competition between local governments with similar size and then to show that « l’intercommunalité » in other words consolidation of municipalities proposed by public authorities, is the only solution to be considered. Classification JEL : H7, R3, R5. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | théorie des jeux |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | coopération fiscale |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | gouvernements locaux |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | concurrence fiscale |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | local governments |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | tax cooperation |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | games theory |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | tax competition |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Revue d’Économie Régionale & Urbaine | février | 1 | 2003-02-01 | p. 83-102 | 0180-7307 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-regionale-et-urbaine-2003-1-page-83?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080">https://shs.cairn.info/revue-d-economie-regionale-et-urbaine-2003-1-page-83?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080</a> |
Pas d'exemplaire disponible.
Réseaux sociaux