3. Lending of last resort in monetary unions: Differing views of German economists in the 19th and 21st centuries (notice n° 146096)
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| fixed length control field | 02062cam a2200229 4500500 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20250112024552.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Trautwein, Hans-Michael |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | 3. Lending of last resort in monetary unions: Differing views of German economists in the 19th and 21st centuries |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2022.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 43 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | The European Central Bank’s activities as lender of last resort are especially controversial in Germany. The overriding concern of the critics is an alleged tendency of creating moral hazard on the side of public and private borrowers in the European Monetary Union. This contrasts with the predominant views among German economists in the classical gold standard era, when the newly founded German empire merged the many currency areas in its realm into monetary union. Prominent experts and policy advisors, such as Erwin Nasse, Adolph Wagner and Friedrich Bendixen, argued that in view of the costs of system failures moral hazard ought not to be a predominant consideration at times of crisis. In critical assessments of the Currency versus Banking debates in England, German commentators questioned the credibility and sustainability of strict rules for monetary policy in banking crises. Some even developed evolutionary views, in which monetary integration is driven by financial markets and lending of last resort becomes constitutive for central banking, in particular in the formation of a monetary union. This paper compares these older German views about lending of last resort with the current discourse and explores possible explanations for the differences.JEL Codes: B15, E58, G01 |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Banking crises |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Lending of last resort |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Monetary union |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Banking crises |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Lending of last resort |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Monetary union |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Papers in Political Economy | o 81 | 2 | 2022-07-01 | p. 61-107 | 0154-8344 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-papers-in-political-economy-2022-2-page-61?lang=en">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-papers-in-political-economy-2022-2-page-61?lang=en</a> |
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