"What Does "Doing the Same Thing" Mean?" (notice n° 140512)
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| control field | 20250112022823.0 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE | |
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title | fre |
| 042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE | |
| Authentication code | dc |
| 100 10 - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME | |
| Personal name | Bouveresse, Jacques |
| Relator term | author |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | "What Does "Doing the Same Thing" Mean?" |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. | |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. | 2001.<br/> |
| 500 ## - GENERAL NOTE | |
| General note | 20 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc. | When we ask whether the rule which governs, for instance, the continuation of a sequence of numbers like 2,4,6,8, ... was or was not followed correctly in a particular instance, a natural answer is that it was, if and only if what has been done is ‘‘ the same thing ’’as in all the preceding applications. However, Wittgenstein observes that the two concepts ‘‘ to do the same thing ’’and ‘‘ to apply the rule correctly ’’are involved in each other in such a way that such an answer is of no help. Some people could very well continue in a deviant way and maintain nevertheless that they do the same thing as what they have done from the beginning, a situation which suggests the possibility of the ‘‘ sceptical paradox ’’which Kripke questions. An important aspect of Wittgenstein’s solution of theparadox consists in pointing out that, even in the case of mathematical rules, the content of therule is neither more nor less determined than the practice of applying the rule. Here, the sceptic reflects as if the content of the rule, however determinate it may be, could still imply a partial or even complete indetermination in the way of applying it. What Wittgenstein means seems to be, precisely, that the rule does not possess the kind of distance and independence which could engender a genuine skeptical problem. |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Uniformity |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Paradox |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Rule |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Recurrence |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Skepticism |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Application |
| 690 ## - LOCAL SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM (OCLC, RLIN) | |
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element | Identity |
| 786 0# - DATA SOURCE ENTRY | |
| Note | Archives de philosophie | Volume 64 | 3 | 2001-09-01 | p. 479-503 | 0003-9632 |
| 856 41 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | <a href="https://shs.cairn.info/journal-archives-de-philosophie-2001-3-page-479?lang=en">https://shs.cairn.info/journal-archives-de-philosophie-2001-3-page-479?lang=en</a> |
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